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Liliana Riga for Thesis Eleven 
 
Ernest Gellner and the Land of the Soviets1 
 
Happiness will originate from materialism, comrade Voshchev, not from meaning. 
—Andrei Platonov, The Foundation Pit2 
 
Ernest Gellner loved Russia and its remarkable intellectual life, and he engaged with the 
Soviet century deeply and with great vitality.3 Soviet Marxism especially fascinated him – 
more than Western Marxism – and it inspired a powerful body of work on what he 
considered an experiment in the creation of a modern secular theocracy. Gellner’s 
theorizations included attention to analytical Marxism, and to actually existing socialism 
as development ideology and as secular religion. And he offered an incisive account of 
the rise and demise of the utopian project, from its revolutionary heroism and Stalinist 
brutality, to the sleaziness and corruption of the years of stagnation, to its sudden 
collapse and the fears and possibilities of post-communism.  
So what can we now make of Gellner’s decades long engagement with the land 
of the Soviets and their utopia that failed? I can offer only schematic reflections on select 
pieces of his enormously original intellectual trail, but I begin with an observation 
George Orwell made in 1944 in a review of Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon. Because 
very few English writers had an ‘inner knowledge of totalitarian methods’, or fully 
grasped what had truly happened within Soviet Marxism,  
 
England [lacked]…what one might call concentration-camp literature. 
The special world created by secret-police forces, censorship of opinion, 
torture and frame-up trials is, of course, known about and to some extent 
disapproved of, but it has made very little emotional impact. One result 
of this is that there exists in England almost no literature of 
disillusionment about the Soviet Union. There is the attitude of ignorant 
disapproval, and there is the attitude of uncritical admiration, but very 
little in between (1951: 150). 
 
Gellner’s work would offer a rare and brilliant something in between, so to say. Perhaps 
it was because, as Orwell suggested, ‘to understand such things one has to be able to 
imagine oneself as the victim’; that is, one has to be a European (1951: 150-151). No 
doubt the upheavals of Gellner’s Central European background allowed him to see 
Soviet totalitarianism with critical, knowledgeable disapproval. It also helped that he was 
never a true believer: as much as he understood the workings of Soviet Marxism, and as 
much as he adored Russia, he nevertheless experienced a life-long anti-Marxist phase. 
Indeed Gellner acknowledged that because he never suffered from Marxism’s illusions, 
he was also saved its subsequent disillusionments (Gellner 1996: 4). And yet, Gellner’s 
liberal, non-Marxist anti-totalitarianism was nevertheless rather distinctive. If he had no 
illusions about the dark side of the Soviet experiment, did he fully appreciate the 
poignancy and depth of its own internal and intimate disillusionments, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I am grateful to James Kennedy and Svetlana Klimova for generous and incisive comments on 
an earlier draft of this article. 
2 P. 4. 
3 I have been deeply influenced here by John A. Hall’s (2010) biography of Gellner, and this is 
reflected throughout.	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consequences of these? I have in mind not the critique of the disillusioned Left, outside 
of the Soviet experience, such as those who penned The God That Failed in 1949; nor that 
of those dissidents from outside the belief but inside the Soviet experience. Rather, I am 
interested in those believers and quasi-believers, the ‘inner exiles’ whose hopes, doubts 
and disillusionments offer a sketch of a moral order that complements Gellner’s. In 
retrieving glimpses of these I hope to add light and shade to the impressive parsimony of 
what are, in my view, the most compelling arguments in Gellner’s analyses of the land of 
the Soviets. 
   
Prophets of meaning and production? 
 
Gellner’s thought seemed consistently attuned to the darker sociology of charisma, 
whether to the cruelties of nationalisms or to those of totalitarianisms. His sociology of 
modernity hewed closely to Weber’s core substantive concerns: reason and 
rationalization, religion and belief, disenchantment as loss of meaning and 
bureaucratization as loss of freedom (Anderson 1992). Gellner’s interest in the structure 
and place of the economy in wider historical social change also made him particularly 
attentive to the Bolsheviks as prophets of production. He had initially conceived of 
Soviet Marxism in Weberian terms, as an ersatz modern Protestant ethic, even along the 
lines of Hume’s sociology of religion, with initial fanaticism eventually restraining 
through custom and routine (Hall 2010: 154). But in later reflections, Gellner came to 
question the view that Soviet Marxism simulated an ethic of production capable of 
successfully carrying Russia through late development (Hall 2010: 357). If Soviet 
Marxism as moral order had looked to be the Calvinism of collective industrialization, it 
ultimately failed to deliver on its own promises, not least because its fusion of political, 
social, ideological and economic hierarchies blocked the socioeconomic pluralism 
necessary for a modern industrial society (Gellner 1994: 30, Chs. 4, 10; 1993: 147).  
This correction was certainly right. But Gellner’s consistent Weberian view of 
Soviet Marxism as a charismatic meaning system still retains its intellectual force. His 
engagement with the inner compulsions and social powers of Marxism’s ideology is one 
of the most forceful aspects of his thinking on the Soviet century. Bolshevism was rare in 
its ecstatic promises and heroic collectivist eschatology – and most especially in the 
depth of internal commitment demanded of its adherents. Chinese communism was 
derivative of this first emergence so it had a more self-conscious inflection; and Fascism 
demanded far less in terms of internal conversion. A crucial Weberian problematic was 
thereby crystallized in the Soviet experiment: could a charismatically organized society 
succeed in a modern scientific and technocratic age?   
In State and Society in Soviet Thought, Gellner offered a forceful account of the 
Marxist theory of society in which, among other things, he worked through the 
implications of coercion being subordinate to or derivative of production (see discussion 
in Hall 2010: 201-204). My interest lies in Gellner’s view of the Soviets as prophets 
armed with a materialist organization of meaning – a secular umma – and as ideologists of 
economic industrialism. Marxism’s distinctive fusion of scientism and moral utopianism 
was attractive to the Russian intelligentsia’s desires for unitary visions. Gellner wrote: ‘the 
Russian people, if Russian literature is to be believed, have a certain predilection not 
merely for faith, but for positive social messianism. Marxism satisfied both these 
cravings’ (1994: 140, 143). It appealed in a place that needed a recipe for overcoming 
weakness and catching up, and for scientific and moral attention to inequality, injustice 
and humiliation: ‘it is tempting to say that Marxism was tailor-made for the Russian soul’, 
a response to a need for westernization consistent with Russia’s mystical-messianic and 
populist yearnings (Gellner 1994: 36). Without dismissing the importance of this 
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dimension of its appeal, however, as a social formation charisma also organizes politics. 
What if in its early charismatic moment, Soviet Marxism emerged not only as a secular-
religious, developmental re-enchantment, but also as a political project? What if one of 
the doctrinal appeals of Marxist socialism for its social carriers was not limited to its class 
analyses or moral unity, but extended also to internationalism’s implied political 
universalism, attractive in contexts of great social complexity in a nationalist and 
industrializing age? What if, in other words, the Bolsheviks were not only moral prophets 
of production, but also empire savers?  
That Gellner paid insufficient attention to ‘politics’ is not an original or new 
critique, of course. Among others, Mann (1992) showed this in relation to Gellner’s work 
on nationalism. But his focus on Soviet Marxism’s analytical incoherence and its real 
world qualities as a meaning-infused moral order may indeed have neglected analysis of 
the early political utility of its umma-ness, beyond its obvious revolutionary power grab. 
Early Soviet Marxists were also multiethnic products of a multiethnic Empire: nearly 
two-thirds were ethnic minorities – Ukrainians, Jews, Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, 
Poles and others – seeking secularism in response to religious tensions and exclusions, an 
ethnically neutral politics to counter marginalization and Russification, and the ‘good 
imperial ideal’ where geopolitics and nationalisms were most challenging (Riga 2012). 
The ethnic Russians were peasants or workers, while the more numerous minorities were 
professionals or intellectuals, an ethnic-class alignment that also broadly characterized 
the Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Kadets. Soviet Marxism, in other words, 
drew from the two social groups that disproportionately sustained the political and 
economic costs of maintaining the Russian Empire in the half century before the 
Revolution: middle class minorities and lower class ethnic Russians. As such, it offered a 
political recipe for status protection and political rule over composite diversity in 
nationalism’s ‘fourth time zone’, where industrialism’s differentiated inequalities 
undergirded the very processes Gellner so extensively theorized elsewhere. Indeed, 
referring to an entirely different historical transition, Gellner (1988: 82) observed that in 
moments of deep social change, ‘to a considerable extent the social base and need for 
some communal religion remains effective: hence a form of ritual which underwrites and 
reinforces social organization, rather than one which replaces it and consoles for its 
absence, also continues to be in demand’. Though a radical ideology of the Left, early 
Soviet Marxism was just such a communal religion – a conservative, charismatic 
underwriting of the new Soviet empire.  
Opening up this political dimension of the Soviet Union’s first decades perhaps 
draws greater attention than did Gellner’s account to the consequences of nationalism 
and state consolidation. Latterly, Gellner worried about the potentially violent 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, but to my knowledge he wrote relatively little on how 
and why Marxism had held ethnic and national diversity – indeed an empire – together. 
‘The Czarist empire’, Gellner wrote, ‘was soon re-established under entirely new 
management and in the name of a uniquely new, formally secular ideology’, allowing the 
Soviets to contain nationalist irredentisms with ease and with a fiction that was 
maintained until its collapse (1994: 116-117, 126). But did this fiction work with ease? 
What were the roles of state building and nationalism? The ethnic diversity of the early 
Soviet leadership stood in notable contrast to the mostly ethnic Russian shock troops of 
the Revolution. Russian workers and conscripts followed what would to them have 
seemed an obviously non-Russian leadership, many of whom spoke Russian with 
accents. This hints at the continued political weakness of Russian nationalism even three 
years into the War. But cultural difference between the elite and their followers was not 
new: Tsarism’s Russian subjects were thoroughly accustomed to being ruled by the non-
Russian Romanovs, even in the provinces and borderlands.  
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From the late 1920s, however, the Soviet elite changed markedly. The Central 
Committees of the early revolutionary years were notable for their ethnic and class 
diversity, but Stalin’s consolidation of power systematically Russianized and 
proletarianized the leadership. This marked off the heterogeneity of early Soviet Marxism 
that was a product of the collapsing Tsarist Empire, from the Russianized homogeneity 
of 1930s’ Soviet Marxism that was a product of the Revolution. It reflected, in other 
words, two distinct nation-building moments. The first involved ideologically re-
constituting a diverse multiethnic empire on a universalist basis given emerging 
nationalisms; the second involved aligning it with Marxism’s ideological content, e.g. 
erasing its diversity and recruiting ethnic Russians with ‘clean’ class backgrounds into the 
CCs. This was of course also reflected in the reversal of wider nationality policies: 
Bolshevik socialists were effective nation builders through the ‘affirmative action’ empire 
of the 1920s, and indeed the new empire’s units were designed following an ethnic logic 
even more than a ‘Marxist’ one (Martin 2001; Hirsch 2005). But by the early 1930s, this 
ethnic embrace ceded to deportations, cleansing, and accusations of national 
deviationism and bourgeois nationalism. The German threat and worries of foreign 
influences in borderland areas mattered, but so too did the logic of nation-state building 
(Brown 2005).  
The violent imposition of Bolshevik control over Ukraine – arguably the crux of 
the empire’s nationality question – was emblematic of the end of the multiethnic political 
project. This involved the Red Terror at the end of 1918, the executions of SRs, 
Anarchists and then each other, the ruthlessness of the conduct of the Civil War, the 
ferocious anti-religious campaigns begun in the 1920s, the ideological war of 1928-1929, 
the ‘grain requisitioning’ policies and suppression of peasant revolts in the early 1920s, 
the collectivization and Terror Famine of the early 1930s, the first deportations of 1930-
31 purging the countryside of kulaks, and the deportations, cleansings and repressions of 
the nationalities. In short, by 1932 a new Soviet elite had been forged under the weights 
of nation-state building, Civil War and peasant and nationalities unrest. Charismatic 
Soviet Marxism Russianized and in the process it changed its character.  
 
The moral order and kramola   
 
One of Gellner’s central problematics was how Soviet Marxism managed to fused truth, 
power and society, and with what consequences. ‘The great weakness of Marxism’, 
Gellner concluded, ‘may be not so much its formal elimination of the transcendent from 
religion, but its over-sacralization of the immanent’ (1994: 40, emphasis in original). Soviet 
Marxism destroyed those institutions capable of opposing and balancing the state, that is, 
the social pluralism necessary for a modern industrial society. Without these, moreover, 
‘a Marxist society is left with no humdrum sphere of the profane into which to escape 
during periods of diminished zeal and enthusiasm’ (Gellner 1993: 146). Indeed, in a 
review of Andrei Sakharov’s memoires, Gellner made the point that Sakharov came to 
appreciate that the Soviet Union was losing the technological race because it lacked 
democratic institutions and intellectual freedom: ‘it was this conclusive defeat in the 
technological and economic race which persuaded men of good will in the Soviet Union 
that change was essential’ (1990b). And yet despite working in a tightly supervised and 
politicized environment – under Igor Kurchatov’s control most famously – Soviet 
nuclear scientists had remarkable intellectual autonomy: leave the physicists alone, Stalin 
famously said, we can always shoot them later (Holloway 1994).  
This created an enthusiastic and intellectually intoxicating atmosphere filled with 
purpose. Sakharov knew of the nature of the regime and of his complicity in gulag labor 
suffering and deaths, but as Gellner quotes him, this knowledge ‘inflamed our sense of 
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drama and inspired us to make a maximum effort so that our sacrifices – which we 
accepted as inevitable – should not be in vain’ (1990b). In the face of all he had seen, 
Gellner observed, Sakharov never fully repudiated Soviet Marxism’s promise. Even in its 
most brutalizing moment, Sakharov remained typical of his generation of professional 
intelligentsia: he absorbed it without either questioning or full engagement, but 
nevertheless thought it ‘produced a lot of rubbish intellectual thought’ (Gellner 1990b). 
So a certain steady Enlightenment moderation never left him, Gellner concluded. And 
yet perhaps Sahkarov’s journey was also rather emblematic of the costs that half-belief 
imposed on individual moralities: he accepted the very real sacrifices and deaths of gulag 
labor as necessary for tomorrow’s socialism - a rather heroic stance, but later worried 
about nuclear testings’ potential deaths hundreds of years hence (Sakharov 1990: Ch. 7, 
8, 14).  
Soviet life was lived all along in the space between heroic sacrifice and the 
accommodationist strategies of everyday survival, so the belief system could only ever be 
half-believed. Among other things, this was manifest in the manner of the system’s 
collapse and in the character of its liberalizations. Because moral institutions had been 
disoriented first by too much faith, and then by too much doubt, it left a structure so 
rigid that ‘when one thing went the whole thing went’ (Gellner 1993: 147). The faith was 
universally abandoned in the absence of the strength of its convictions, so at some point 
the Soviet Union became an illegitimate ancien regime blind to its own illegitimacy 
(Gellner 1979a: 319-320; 1994: 38). Moreover, Gellner (1979a: 333; 1979b: 338) 
concluded, it is harder to liberalize from socialism than capitalism because in the latter 
privileges can be maintained as wealth, while in the former privileges are in virtue of 
one’s position. The Leninist Party could not reform the Leninist Party, as Jowitt (1983, 
1992) has argued: the consequences of Khrushchev’s withdrawal of Soviet Marxism’s 
‘combat quality’ were experienced for the first time under Brezhnev – leaving a Party so 
rotted that it had no capacity left to sacrifice for anything. 
Against all of this, Gellner understood Civil Society as an a-moral social order, 
indeed one almost universally desired by those living in the Soviet bloc (1994: 54, 137, 
139-141). But he cautioned, ‘it is perhaps for further historical research to determine just 
how totally [Civil Society] was destroyed, and to what extent talk about atomization of 
society in that [Brezhnev] period is an exaggeration’ (1990a: 331, quote on 336; 1994: Ch. 
1). Because the role of Civil Society and its atomization was so fundamental for Gellner, 
we should begin to take up his challenge. We might begin with Khrushchev’s Thaw, the 
interim period between the Terror and the Stagnation, slightly under-theorized by 
Gellner, who viewed it as a period of admitting Marxism’s ‘deformations’ but disavowing 
neither the faith nor its doctrines (1990a: 334-5; 1993: 142; 1994: 2-3). First, in declaring 
the class enemy defeated, Khrushchev ended the defining combative moral claim at the 
heart of the ideological crusade. Second, in confirming nuclear parity with the United 
States, he loosened identification with a Russified-Soviet nationalist competition with the 
West. But third, this identification was replaced by a policy of Russification-light: 
educational reforms in 1959 formally made Russian the language of inter-ethnic 
communication and parents were given the choice of language of their children’s 
instruction. This choice was particularly appealing for urban minorities outside the titular 
nationalities: by the early 1980s most minority children were educated in Russian, 
interethnic marriages resulted in ‘Russian’ children, and on Census data Soviet citizens 
increasingly identified with the Soviet ‘Russian’ (Gorenburg 2006). Fourth, after decades 
of brutalizing sacrifice, in the early 1960s socialism’s sunny future finally seemed to 
materialize: relatives newly released from labor camps came home; there was a dramatic 
and real rise in living standards; the enormous construction boom of cheap apartments 
was the beginning of the end of communal living; there was increased availability of cars, 
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televisions, refrigerators and small country houses; employment became were more 
stable with more guaranteed pensions, and so on.  
Taken together, then, for the very first time in the Soviet experiment, the gap 
between what Russians were ideologically meant to be experiencing and what they were in 
fact materially experiencing actually narrowed. If life had been lived simultaneously on 
two scales – in the quotidian ordinariness of the everyday and in the Official Socialist 
Utopia – the combativeness of the latter was suddenly re-dimensioned. The cheap 
modern uniformity of Khrushchev’s mass housing boom and the destruction of 
monuments to Stalinist grandiosity created neighborhood ordinariness underneath fading 
Official Patriotism (Boym 2001: Ch. 8). We are only beginning to get a richer sense of 
this period, but recent archival openings for the immediate post-Stalin era offer a more 
textured sense of the experience of the ‘secret skepticism’ of ordinary Russians (as 
distinct from that of intelligentsia dissident culture) that Gellner described. (The current 
Russian leadership was a product of this era: Vladimir Putin was in high school in 1968.) 
The availability of Soviet prosecution records of ordinary citizens arrested for 
expressing discontent underscores the sociological significance of the period in terms of 
dissent. In kramola, a pre-nineteenth century political concept for sedition and grassroots 
dissent, one fantastic recent study offers detailed accounts of the subversive qualities of 
ordinary discontent from Stalin’s death in 1953 through the 1970s, reaching its peak not 
under Brezhnev but under Khrushchev (Kozlov et.al. 2011). Kramola implies over-
reaction on the part of the state to any suggestions of freethinking – Sakharov preferred 
to self-ascribe as a ‘free thinker’, not a dissident. This included: criticisms of Stalin; 
underground groups that appeared as ‘conversation circles’ of families and friends, with 
children imagining themselves nineteenth century revolutionaries; the diffusion of the 
Russian practice of writing anonymous letters of complaint to petition authorities or 
denounce the misdeeds of local officials and the ‘gang of thieves in the Kremlin’; 
complaints about local goods and services, reflecting resentments of ‘elite privileges as 
betrayals of the promise of workers’ power’; and handwritten criticisms scribbled on 
voting ballots (Kozlov et. al. 2011: 3, 10-15, Chs. 4, 6). For these acts, people were 
punished, though over time there was greater use of ‘prophylactic measures’, e.g. official 
warnings. Despite a surge in the number of prosecutions in the late 1950s, when not only 
acts but also ‘styles of thinking’ were punished, repression in both the Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev eras had a closer relationship to actual deeds – testimony, too, of the gradual 
exhaustion of the repressive apparatus from within, since it required more official effort 
to show ‘counter-revolutionary’ than ‘anti-Soviet’ intent (Kozlov et. al. 2011: 38-39, and 
44-49 for data). An ordinary and an even thornier ‘combat quality’ surfaced. The 
capitalist class enemy was replaced by an older, and more banal, historic enemy replaced 
the class enemy: the local bureaucrat. 
In short, a more sophisticated and complex understanding of civic life in post-
Stalinist Russia Social emerges, one in which moral life in the form of kramola continued 
to operate underneath the weight of the Soviet umma’s constraints, as it had when the 
Bolsheviks were the nineteenth century kramol’niki. Beneath the grand scale of 
Totalitarianism and its well-publicized dissident intelligentsia – which the state had 
anyway successfully discredited in the eyes of most ordinary Russians – there remained a 
zone of ordinary existence with strategies of defiance, in the sistema of elusive unofficial 
networking, in its subtle survivalist devices, and in its kramola. This was certainly not Civil 
Society in the classical liberal, indeed, Gellnerian sense. But most Soviet citizens were 
being continuously ‘mobilized’ for one thing or another, and one senses that the 
experience of feeling ‘atomized’ may actually have been more acutely felt by intellectuals 
than ordinary Russians. Moreover, something of ‘the social’ underneath constraint 
survived and developed its own practices of social trust and individual morality. It was 
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enough liberalization that there a still something to oppose, and it was now possible to 
oppose it without enormous personal cost. Perestroika changed this by removing all 
constraint, bringing an accompanying sense of disorientation. During the mid-nineteenth 
century period of Great Reforms and serf emancipations, the great writer and social 
observer, Gleb Uspensky (1903), observed in the 1870s with great subtlety that the 
‘wretched state’ of the newly emancipated village proletariat of the liberalizing era was 
due less to their material state than to their loss of moral orientation, to the kind of 
purposelessness that sudden relative freedom from constraint can bring.4 This, too, was a 
feature of the liberalizations of socialism’s moral order. 
 
The Terror and the Squalor   
 
Hall (2010: 357) notes that Gellner understood Stalinism and the periods of heroic 
sacrifice within the terms of Marxism’s morality. So how – and when – did the big moral 
idea become corrupted, meaningless ritual? 
 
Faith survived random and mass terror, and indeed found a confirmation 
in it; the final, total transformation of the human condition was 
confirmed in blood. But faith did not survive the squalor in the economic 
sphere. The vision of the nomenklatura murdering each other was 
acceptable, but that it is bribing each other was not. The squalid, grey, 
sleazy inefficiency of the productive process in the Brezhnev era really 
eroded the faith. (Gellner 1993: 146-147). 
 
The period of the Squalor’s comparative inefficiency was the real moment of 
demoralization. The Terror was not only ‘a compensation for the lack of more humdrum 
legitimacy’, but it also confirmed the validity of the faith (Gellner 1979a: 325). Gellner’s 
account of the respective roles of the Terror and the Squalor in the Soviet century is one 
of the most forceful arguments in his thinking on actually existing Soviet socialism. I 
suggested above that the years between Stalinism and the Squalor or the Stagnation were 
significant in terms of understanding the ‘atomization thesis’ and the workings (and 
loosening) of moral constraint, both of which perhaps remain under-theorized in 
Gellner’s account of the Soviet century. We might similarly want to deepen the 
significance of the 1920s in relation to the Stalinist decades of heroic sacrifice. By better 
grasping the prior moral collapse of charismatic Bolshevism – arguably one of the 
Terror’s permissive causes – we might open another dimension of Soviet Marxism’s 
most socially brutalizing moment, and shed light on its most ‘squalid’.  
Although a full sociological account of the inner geography of the Bolsheviks as 
a collective elite through the 1920s has still to be written, charismatic Bolshevism 
changed its character certainly by 1930 or 1932, though most historians see a decisive 
shift in 1928 or 1929. I noted the coercive nation-state building involved in the first 
decades of imposing and consolidating Bolshevik rule in the new empire, but this is 
worth exploring further. Many were deeply affected by their personal experiences of the 
front in 1917-1921, particularly in the so-called violent provinces in Ukraine. But there 
was much more: executions of comrades and political opponents (Anarchists, SRs, and 
others), betrayals, violent rages, incapacitating alcoholism (Preobrazhenskii, among 
others), suicides (nearly as many as during the purges of 1937-1938), drug and cocaine 
addition and its violent rages (Dzierzynski, but more widely among the Cheka elite), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I thank Svetlana Klimova, who is working on Uspensky and civil society, for bringing him to 
my attention and for conversation on his thought. 
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impossible family lives, extortions, arrests, forced exiles, imprisonments, tortures of 
fellow comrades, profound personal crises, the first ‘show trials’, painful depressions, 
episodes of debilitating remorse for mass killings (notably Piatakov, for a terrible 
massacre in Crimea, see Graziosi 1992: esp. 113-114, 120-126). Many had to testify to 
their faith or find themselves in prison or exile: in 1922, Piatakov – himself a later victim 
of the purges – presided over the first ‘show trials’ of the SRs, using the tactic of 
‘unmasking’, in what would become a key feature of Stalinism more than a decade later 
(Graziosi 1992: 109-110, 118).  
The totalizing nature of the ideological changes, the deadly debates of 1927 to 
1929, and the devastated social world of the late 1920s are captured in Platonov’s 
terrifying 1930 dystopian novel, The Foundation Pit. As Socialism’s ideological mass grave 
(the foundation pit) is built, its material significance fades in direct proportion to growing 
ideological dogmatism. Platonov had been a Bolshevik, a True Believer as Gellner might 
say, and among the Soviet writers of the era with the most intimate knowledge of the 
peasantry in the 1920s as a land reclamation expert for the People’s Commissariat of 
Agriculture. By describing the experience of collectivist morality from within the new 
Soviet linguistic idiom, he furrowed out its lies; not the lies of Soviet Marxism’s political 
narrative as theory, but of the ways in which the narrative was experienced. Characters 
think, question, doubt, wonder and speculate, just at the historical moment when 
‘thoughtfulness’ became counterrevolutionary and dogmatism began to structure daily 
life; its dystopianism sheds light on Socialism’s erosion from the shrunken intellectual 
atmosphere inside the experience of the Belief (Clowes 2004: Ch.9). 
The 1920s witnessed the moral exhaustion and costs of decades of sustained 
revolutionary radicalization, the descent into what Graziosi (1992: 119) has called the 
‘progressive barbarization’ of the cultured Bolshevik intelligentsia of Tsarism. This 
collapse and generational transition within the ideocracy changed the moral frames of 
Soviet Marxism. Platonov’s new Party ‘Activist’ was surrounded by ‘poor people who 
had grown thin from uninterrupted heroism’, and by the ‘socialist children’ who would 
be beyond the reach of an old, wounded and legless war veteran, a ‘freak of imperialism’ 
(2010: 7, 78). In the same way that Koestler’s Old Bolshevik, Rubashov, was a 
Europeanized product of the Tsarist Empire’s intelligentsia, but the ‘party man’ who 
interrogated him was a product of the Revolution, of Platonov’s newly trained and 
enthusiastic 1920s ideologues. Rubashov suffered ‘mental bankruptcy’, because as Orwell 
put it, he ‘is not only alone, he is also hollow’, a former hardened revolutionary worn 
down by so remarkably little (1951: 155-156). But Graziosi (1992: 126-127) rightly hints 
at the historical anachronism at the heart of Darkness at Noon: the reasoning it attributes 
to the Old Bolsheviks in 1936-1938 was that used in capitulations ten years earlier –the 
mid-1920s Bolshevik world that Koestler knew well.  
In other words, the internal collapse of charismatic Bolshevism through the 
nation-state building 1920s profoundly shaped the moral climate and the possibilities of 
the 1930s and 1940s. Theorizing Stalinism as ‘charismatic impersonalism’, Jowitt (1992) 
argued that the Leninist Party represented a fourth form of legitimate modern authority 
missed by Weber, whereby the bureaucratized Party itself becomes the routinized object 
of heroic ecstatic commitment and sacrifice. Gellner’s account elides most of this, in my 
view, in favor of analytical conciseness. And yet the character of Soviet Marxism and its 
original believers changed so drastically, that the political artifice began to sociologically 
resemble the fearful complicity of despotism more than the inner compulsions of 
charisma’s moral legitimacy. Of course much turns on whether we understand the 
Terror’s apparatchiki more survivalists that as ideologues, and we will know more as 
additional scholarly studies on newly released archival materials come out. But it seems 
to be slowly confirming the view – indeed Sakharov’s view – that the General’naia Liniia 
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rested more on personalization, idiosyncracy and ad hoc inventions than on derivations 
of Marxism. Beginning with the significance of Stalin’s 1927 decision to collectivize 
agriculture and accelerate industrialization despite much internal dissent, and through its 
catastrophic consequences, according to a recent biographer, the archive evidence 
suggests that this was Stalin’s own conviction, formed idiosyncratically within the term of 
Marxist morality as he individually understood it (Kotkin 2014). Stalinism harnessed 
bureaucratic power despotically not charismatically, in other words; enforced enthusiasm 
is hardly enthusiasm. Still, if the moral boundary was in aims and not methods, the 1936-
1938 Terror seemed nevertheless to have shaken Soviet citizens profoundly, causing the 
Party to retreat into sterility and to a revival of the nativism and russocentrism that had 
been previously closed off (see discussion in Brandenberger 2012: Ch. 9, 10).  
But in the struggle over Soviet Marxism’s diminution of inner life, to some 
degree or other Soviet citizens lived simultaneously within the scale of ordinariness and 
that of the Great Ideological project through the entirety of the Soviet project. Gellner 
(1990a: 344-345) observed that Soviet Marxism’s failure ‘to provide rituals and solaces 
for individual tragedy, alongside its collectivist eschatology also makes its contribution’. 
In my view this needs as much attention as his emphasis on its final squalor and 
inefficiency, or its failure to deliver promises and the resulting cynicism. ‘We hate our 
squalor’, Platonov’s character says, but it is the suffocation of meaning by materialist 
existence that is most punishing – not least because ‘inner meaning would have 
improved productivity’ (2010: 3). For Gellner, much was lost in decades of ordinary 
cynicism, in the Brezhnevite Squalor when the tone of the system 
 
…became more cynical and corrupt, and, from the viewpoint of the 
messianic soteriology of Marxism, more routinized, disabused, doubly 
secularized, so to speak. This cynicism could not be expressed in public, 
so those who consciously articulated it to themselves had to indulge in 
this like a solitary vice’ (1990a: 334-5).  
 
And yet, perhaps this cynicism was also a form of critique, of kramola, not only a solitary 
vice – and not only during the Squalor, but throughout. Cynicism is not disillusionment, 
which is passive and resigned, even nostalgic for what might have been. Cynicism also 
contains a forceful moral claim aimed at power. It is hostile and aggressive, springing 
from a politics that imposes an alienation from one’s own experiences, in the way in 
which Platonov’s young Nastya asks, ‘why are you dying, mama? From being bourgeois – 
or from death?’ (2010: 49). It is less aimed at the failure of the political promise, than at 
those political lies that turn the meaning of the hard surface of experience into a lie. 
 
Reflections: the post-Soviets 
 
In 1989, Gellner (1990a: 349) observed the ‘success fou’ that theatre adaptations of 
Bulgakov’s 1925 dystopian novel, Heart of a Dog, were enjoying in Moscow, hoping that 
its resonance in Gorbachev’s Russia was not due to its pessimistic message. Of course 
Bulgakov’s 1920s dystopianism, like that of Zamyatin, Platonov and Krzhizhanovsky 
(whose work was also published in 1989) described the world of the New Soviet Man of 
the 1920s, satirizing the imagined gains of scientific materialism at the cost of meaning, 
and the latter’s the revolt of the heart. The unique problem of Soviet science fiction, of 
course, had always been that there could never be an imagined utopia from which to be 
critical, no place or time from which to critique the present Utopia. The imaginative 
solution of the Stalin era was ‘close aim’ science fiction, set more narrowly in tomorrow’s 
industrial achievement and in this solar system, not in distant futures or distant galaxies; 
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today’s post-Soviet science fiction dystopias are mostly written by ethnic Russians in 
Kharkiv and Kiev. What would Gellner think of this? His commentary on these years of 
post-communism is truly missed. He might write, for instance, of the current fashion 
which has post-communism moving on to its ‘post’ post phase, perhaps even to post-
Totalitarianism’s ironic moment. I imagine that he would relish the fact that in re-
appropriating (rather than erasing) historical crimes, a group of Moscow artists had 
proposed turning Karl Marx’s bust in front of the Bolshoi Theatre on its head, ‘in 
homage to what he himself did to Hegelian dialectics’ (Boym 2001: 90).  
Still, post-communism has a certain kind of uncontested finality. Gellner (1993: 
152; 1990a: 336) feared that its moral-ideological vacuum might be filled by nationalisms. 
And Russian nationalism may be doing this for those generations born in the ‘post’ era, 
in its cultural retrieval of an anti-Western and distinctively ‘Russian’ subjectivity, located 
in pre-revolutionary Russia or in a pre-WWI Soviet pastoral. But the socialist promise 
also still resonates for many in Russia. The loss of utopia – of the future that never was – 
has been deeply painful to many Russians of certain generations. Its effects continue to 
be experienced, not least in a continued political cynicism and a concomitant longing for 
those decades of familiar stability into which the experiment had mundanely – if not 
entirely successfully – routinized. There are many who miss the mundane simplicity of 
late socialism, with its 1960s trams and trolleys, Soviet films and popular culture of the 
1970s; a middle-aged population longs for the stability and relative normalcy of their 
youth, when the future was merely extended. Both the nationalist and socialist 
aspirations poignantly imply a return to eras of more or less constraint.  
Gellner sensed much of this even in the very early ‘post’ days. He understood 
Soviet Marxism from a position outside of both its enchantments and its profoundest 
disenchantments. He found intellectual alignment with the liberal dissident experience, or 
those from within the Soviet experience who had likewise never believed – or never fully 
believed – and who had lived it mostly as its victims. So to the richness and originality of 
his work, we might perhaps add the particular disillusionments and sense of loss of 
Soviet Marxism’s ‘inner exiles’. On return from his last extended year in Moscow, he 
observed a marked discontinuity in moral climate among the political elite of the late 
1980s, one in which they could say and do things previously unthinkable. Even so, he 
thought, deep ambiguities regarding the demise of the socialist experiment nevertheless 
continued to exist: the ‘repudiation is not complete’, Gellner concluded in a talk at 
Cambridge in 1989. This may still be true. But then, the loss of ‘the socialist generation’ 
has been ‘tantamount to the destruction not only of all the past but also of the future’ 
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